Abstract. Electronic Exchanges are double-sided marketplaces that allows multiple buyers to trade with multiple sellers, with aggregation of demand and supply across the bids to maximize the revenue in the market. In this paper, we propose a new design approach for an one-shot exchange that collects bids from buyers and sellers and clears the market at the end of the bidding period. The main principle of the approach is to decouple the allocation from pricing. It is well known that it is impossible for an exchange with voluntary participation to be efficient and budget-balanced. Budget-balance is a mandatory requirement for an exchange to operate in profit. Our approach is to allocate the trade to maximize the reported values of the agents. The pricing is posed as payoff determination problem that distributes the total payoff fairly to all agents with budget-balance imposed as a constraint. We devise an arbitration scheme by axiomatic approach to solve the payoff determination problem using the added-value concept of game theory.
Introduction
Markets play a central role in any economy and facilitate the exchange of information, goods, services, and payments. They are intended to create value for buyers, sellers, and for society at large. Markets have three main functions [1] :matching buyers to sellers; facilitating exchange of information, goods, services, and payments associated with a market transaction; and providing an institutional infrastructure. Internet-based E-markets leverage information technology to perform these functions with increased effectiveness and reduced transaction costs, leading to more efficient, friction-free markets. In this paper, our interest is in providing a new approach to the design of exchanges. Exchanges allows multiple buyers to trade with multiple sellers, with aggregation of demand and supply across the bids to maximize the revenue in the market. The approach is to decouple allocation from pricing. This is not a new approach as Vickrey
This research is supported in part by IBM Research Fellowship awarded to the first author by IBM India Research Laboratory, New Delhi mechanisms essentially do the same. However, our objectives in the design are budget-balance and individual rationality rather than efficiency and incentive compatibility. Our approach is in the line with the constructive approach to mechanism design in [11], but our pricing scheme is different. We propose an arbitration scheme for pricing, based on an axiomatic approach that captures the intuitive relationships between the payoff and added-value concept of game theory.
Electronic Exchanges
Exchanges are double-sided marketplaces where both buyers and sellers submit bids for trading. We refer sellers' bids as offers if required to differentiate them from that of buyers. The exchanges differ in functionality with respect to timing of clearing, number of bid submissions, pricing, aggregation and the varieties of goods traded. In this paper, our interest is in designing one-shot exchanges, where buyers and sellers submit bids during the bidding period and the market is cleared at the end of the bidding interval. This is similar to call markets or clearing house [6] but the bids may have multiple attributes and can be combinatorial in nature.
Design Issues
The two core problems in an exchange are allocation and pricing [11] . In certain exchanges pricing determines the allocation. In call markets [6] , the price at which there is a maximal match in supply and demand is used to clear the market. But there are exchanges that decouple allocation from pricing. For e.g., the Generalized Vickrey Auction (GVA) [13] allocates the goods that maximizes the reported bid values and pricing is done based on allocation. Our approach is to decouple allocation from pricing but with a different set of objectives than that of GVA. We call the allocation problem as the trade determination problem (TDP) and the pricing problem as the payoff determination problem. TDP determines the goods traded between every pair of buyers and sellers and the PDP prices the goods traded by determining the payoff (to be defined later) to individual agents.
Impossibility Result
Useful economic properties of an exchange include [11]:
-Allocative-efficiency (EFF): Trade should be executed to maximize the total increase in value over all agents. -Individual-rationality (IR): No agent should pay more than its net increase in value for the items it trades. -Budget-balance (BB): The total payments received by the exchange from agents should be at least the total payments made by the exchange to agents.
